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Abstract—Honeypot still plays an important role in network
security, especially in analyzing attack type and defining at-
tacker patterns. Previous research has mainly focused on de-
tecting attack pattern while categorization of type has not yet
been-comprehensively discussed. Nowadays, the web applica-
tion is the most common and popular way for users to gather
information, but it also invites attackers to assault the system.
Therefore, deployment of a web honeypot is important and its
forensic analysis is urgently required. In this paper, authors
propose attack type analysis from web honeypot log for foren-
sic purposes. Every log is represented as a vertex in a graph.
Then a custom agglomerative clustering to categorize attack
type based on PHP-IDS rules is deployed. A visualization
of large graphs is also provided since the actual logs contain
tens of thousands of rows of records. The experimental results
show that the proposed model can help forensic investigators
examine a web honeypot log more precisely.
Keywords—access log, attack type, graph agglomerative cluster-
ing, visualization of large graphs.
1. Introduction
A honeypot is a system that lets attackers hack into it
and records all activities so that their behavior can be ob-
served [1]. There are several types of honeypots based on
various services for example web, SSH, database, and net-
work traffic or using the level of interaction or the responses
given to the attacker, i.e. low, medium, and high [1]. The
use of honeypots for forensic analysis was first developed in
2002 [2]. The researchers proposed a new forensic model
and two architectures for honeypots, serial and parallel.
In [3] the researcher tried to find the root cause of attack
in a honeypot and the association rules were deployed to
detect suspicious activity.
Forensic analysis can be conducted of both network traf-
fic [4] and the compromised host [5] to get more detailed
information from honeypot logs. More advanced tech-
niques to review honeypot capabilities were introduced by
using file system journaling [6]. It provided deeper anal-
ysis through file system abstraction to achieve meta data
archiving. Forensic investigators are also able to generate
attack statistics reports from honeypot deployment as ob-
served in [7], [8]. Riebach et al. provided a case study of
honeypot deployment to support forensic analysis and gave
more attention to worm activities and classical multi-phase
attack [9].
The investigation can be conducted in real time, usually
called live forensic, as designed in [10] and the author fo-
cused on HTTP, FTP, POP3, and telnet protocols. Virtu-
alization technology, cheaper than physical infrastructure
could be used to deploy honeypots and supply real time
forensics [11]. Attacker pattern was deeply investigated
in [12] by clustering technique and time series analysis.
The honeypot could be used for army of zombies detec-
tion [13]. They supplied an accurate observation of a bot-
net attack from honeypot trace. The other study of network
forensics based on honeypot has been comprehensively de-
scribed in [14]. They provided a survey, comparison, and
future directions for this research area. Another work to
provide honeypot for production mode of web application
has been proposed by Pohl et al. since most honeypots
only provide service in a non-productive environment [15].
The implementation of many honeypot platforms is also
presented in [16]. However, these previous works still have
not provided any interactive, collaborative, or real tools to
model and visualize a web honeypot log.
Valli presented a visualization of honeypot data based on
graph theory using Graphviz library and exploited After-
Glow for generating link graphs [17]. However, it could
not provide interactive display for forensic investigators al-
though could give large graph visualization. A recent study
by Cabaj gives a graph visualization to assist in data analy-
sis generated by honeypots [18]. The paper described visu-
alization of the Honeypot Management System (HPMS) de-
ployed at Institute of Computer Science, Warsaw University
of Technology, but unfortunately this work only handled an
attack to phpMyAdmin.
In this paper, a model for web honeypot logs based on graph
theory is proposed. The authors will adopt the graph model
to represent a log, and clustering technique will be deployed
to analyze attacks for forensic purposes. The forensic in-
vestigation will be covered, which needs to know the origin
and the type of penetration, e.g., cross site scripting or re-
mote file inclusion. The visualization of proposed method
will relax the one proposed by Cabaj [18].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
briefly describes the proposed log model based on graph
theory, rule-based attack detection technique, and visual-
ization of generated large graph. Section 3 explains ex-
perimental results and its analysis. Finally, conclusion and
future works are discussed in Section 4.
2. Proposed Method
2.1. Graph-based Agglomerative Cluster
The main evidence for forensic analysis is the raw access
log containing every request to the web honeypot. This
60
Graph-based Forensic Analysis of Web Honeypot
artifact was provided by Honeynet Project [19]. Authors
then define graph G = (V,E) to represent all access logs,
propose custom agglomerative clustering on the set of ver-
tices V , and generate edges E during the clustering process.
The similarity measurement for clustering is used based
on the node’s attributes value, i.e., attack type, attacker’s
IP address, origin city and country. This gives an exact
similarity since these properties are standardized for all
vertices. Therefore, there are six levels of hierarchy in the
resulting cluster, i.e., one level for leaf vertex representing
the raw request and five upper-levels of intermediate nodes,
which represent cluster root of attack type, IP address, city,
country, and top-level cluster of the main graph used for
overall forensic analysis. Cluster C as a subgraph of G is
defined as:
C =
{
Cli |C ⊂G, l = 0,1, . . . 5 and i = 0,1, . . . , p
}
, (1)
where l is level of hierarchy and p is a set of the total
number of clusters in specific level l as shown in Fig. 1 and
every level is represented by a different color. Meanwhile,
the node size also depicts level in graph – the deeper the
level, the smaller its size.
level 5
level 4
level 3
level 2
level 1
level 0
Fig. 1. Illustration of hierarchy level in proposed method. (See
color pictures online at www.nit.eu/publications/journal-jtit)
In addition, by Vl j the set of vertices of G in cluster level l
is denoted:
V = {v0 j ,v1 j , . . . ,vlm} , (2)
where j = 0,1, . . . ,m and m is the total number of logs
plus intermediate nodes created during clustering in level l.
These vertices store every record and its attributes including
id, attacker’s remote address, time stamp, raw request, re-
ferrer, user agent, origin city and country, attack type and
its description. Thus, some flags are also maintained as
node’s attributes in order to handle the clustering process,
i.e., is attackroot, is iproot, is cityroot, is countryroot, and
is mainroot. These flags also distinguish whether or not
a vertex is a root of a particular cluster.
Furthermore, there are six types of edges based on cluster
level, El . These edges connect vertices to the intermediate
node in each cluster and are defined as follows:
E = {E0k ,E1k , . . . ,Eln} (3)
where k = 0,1, . . . ,n and n is total number of cluster Cli .
For each Elk , one can see an edge as a tuple consisting of
a vertex and its connected cluster root:
Elk = {(v0 j ,R0i),(v1 j ,R1i), . . . , (vl j ,Rli)} , (4)
where variable i, j, and l have been described in previous
equations.
Before creating edges E , all of the vertices based on IP
address and attack type attributes are clustered. For each
cluster, the procedure creates one vertex as an intermediate
node acting as cluster root R. In other words, all vertices
except vm are an intermediate node. Formally,
R = V \ {vx j}, x = 0,1, . . . , m−1 . (5)
After that, every vertex in cluster Cli will have an edge to
the root R(l−1)i so that Elk is a set of edges in Cli . The first
created R will act as R4i , root of cluster by attack type, and
every R4 has an edge to R3, root of cluster by attacker’s IP
address. This step will provide E4 and generates all C4i and
its R4i . In this way, investigators can easily examine how
many and what type of attacks were attempted from one IP
address. The illustration of how to cluster vertices based
on attack type and IP address are given in Figs. 2 and 3,
respectively, where the vertices with the same attribute
have the same color. In these figures, only 26 records
consisting of two detected attacks (cross-site scripting
and local file inclusion), seven IP addresses, three cities
(Budapest, Seoul, and Osan), and two countries (Hun-
gary and Korea) from the first file of the Honeynet Project
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
none
normal
Local File Inclusion (LFI)
Fig. 2. Cluster by attack type.
193.224.164.47
none
124.0.24.82
81.182.193.240
203.236.3.225
210.94.41.89
59.12.14.25
203.236.3.241
Fig. 3. Cluster by IP address.
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dataset [19] in order to reduce the complexity of visuali-
zation are used.
The clustering continues to agglomerate existing group C3
based on the origin city and then country of attacker. This
geographic information is based on IP address and can be
retrieved using the open GeoIP API module provided by
MaxMind [20] and its Python bindings [21] for easy imple-
mentation. This procedure will produce cluster C2, cluster
by city, and C1, cluster by country. The edges are drawn
from every vertex in C2 and C1 to their respective inter-
mediate root R so that we now have E1 and E2. Figure 4
provides clustering based on city data and the illustration
of cluster by country can be easily inferred from Fig. 4.
All illustrations in this section use the Yifan Hu graph lay-
out [22] implemented in Gephi graph editor [23]. The
more complex graph drawing will be explained in the next
subsection.
Budapest Seoul Osan none
Fig. 4. Cluster by city.
In the last iteration, all separate clusters C1 are connected
to the main root R0, resulting in both sets of edges E0 and
the cluster C0. Through the clustering, each root flag is set
to True according to processed level. This bottom-up ap-
proach provides a complete graph for forensic analysis and
understanding the origin of attacks. The proposed method
also provides a natural hierarchical structure to assist foren-
sic investigators to understand attacker’s behavior.
2.2. Attack Type Detection Using PHP-IDS Rules
The authors match every request log with the PHP-Intrusion
Detection System (PHP-IDS) [24]. PHP-IDS rules cur-
rently contain 78 filters categorized to nine attack types:
cross-site scripting (XSS), SQL injection (SQLi), cross-site
request forgery (CSRF), denial of service (DoS), directory
traversal (DT), spam, information disclosure (ID), remote
file execution (RFE), and local file inclusion (LFI). Orig-
inally, these filters are utilized to check whether or not
a request is suspicious in a PHP-based web application and
it is installed and preconfigured inside the application.
However, instead of using PHP-IDS to detect attack in ante
mortem conditions, the rules to assist forensic investiga-
tors are adopted, when examining the type of attack in post
mortem fashion. PHP-IDS filters contain a sequence of reg-
ular expression (regex), which is developed and maintained
periodically by the community. The examples of PHP-IDS
filters are given in Table 1 [24].
Table 1
Example of PHP-IDS filters
No. Filter and description Tag
1
(?:%u(?:ff|00|e\d)\w\w)|
XSS
(?:(?:%(?:e\w|c[^3\W]|))(?:%\w\w)(?:%\w\w)?)
Detects halfwidth/fullwidth encoded unicode HTML
breaking attempts
2
(?:(?:[;]+|(<[?%](?:php)?)).*[^\w]
RFE
(?:echo|print|print_r|var_dump|[fp]open))|
(?:;\s*rm\s+-\w+\s+)|(?:;.*{.*\$\w+\s*=)|
(?:\$\w+\s*\[\]\s*=\s*)
Detects code injection attempts
3
(?:%c0%ae\/)|(?:(?:\/|\\)(home|conf|usr|etc|
LFI
proc|opt|s?bin|local|dev|tmp|kern|[br]oot|sys|
system|windows|winnt|program|%[a-z_-]{3,}%)
(?:\/|\\))|(?:(?:\/|\\)inetpub|
localstart\.asp|boot\.ini)
Detects specific directory and path traversal
To implement the filters in test environment, an Apache
Scalp, a Python implementation of PHP-IDS [25] updated
using the newest PHP-IDS rules is deployed. Every filter
can be attached to one or more attack types (tag) but only
the first-found one using non-exhaustive mode in Apache
Scalp is included. The procedure first parses the raw re-
quest, detects the HTTP method used, and then compares
the request line to every regular expression in predefined
filters. It returns the attack type for each attacker request
to the web honeypot server.
2.3. Large Graph Visualization for Attack Type Analysis
The authors use Gephi [23] as graph editor and
OpenOrd [26] as large graph layout since there are tens
of thousands of logs to process and the existing typical lay-
out can not well visualize large graph generated. Previous
visualization by Cabaj [18] only displays a small portion
of the attack where the vertices represent attacker, malware
filename, and malware server. The display only showed
a small part of the graph so the investigator may not see
the entire attack attempts.
Presented work improves upon the one from [18] where
the visualization is created as a tool to help forensic in-
vestigators inspect the attack type and the attacker location
comprehensively using a large graph layout. An example
of overall graph is shown in Fig. 5 where each color repre-
sents an attacks type: cross-site scripting (light green), re-
mote file execution (purple), and local file inclusion (dark
green) [19]. Normal means the request is not malicious
and None is for an intermediate node for clustering. One
can see in Fig. 5 that this visualization model will easily
help the investigator to view, check, and analyze both nor-
mal requests and attempted attacks to the web honeypot as
a whole. One can not clearly see the local file inclusion
attack since it has only a very small number compared to
overall records.
62
Graph-based Forensic Analysis of Web Honeypot
normal
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Remote File Execution (RFE) none
Local File Inclusion (LFI)
Fig. 5. Generated graph G from Honeynet Project dataset.
To enable the collaboration and interactive graph, the net-
work graph from Gephi to Sigma.js was exported and
hosted it a in Sigma.js server so that the investigator can
access this visualization using a web interface. Sigma.js is
a JavaScript library based on Node.js that is specially de-
signed for interactive graph drawing [27]. The interactive
mode means that the user is provided with a clickable ver-
tex and cluster of vertices. This technique completes the
analysis provided by large graph visualization with detailed
examination of each request by displaying more detailed in-
formation when a node is clicked.
3. Experimental Results
The dataset used in this experiment is taken from the
Honeynet Project [19], which is a real-life log from
honeypot deployed in 2006. The complete dataset con-
tains all logs in the /var/log directory from Linux Fedora
operating system. As the authors focused on web honeypot,
only the access log file from /var/log/httpd has been taken
into account. There are 32 access log files consisting of
31 archives and one recent log containing 14,398 lines of
raw requests, and we examined only the last one. Every
line in the log file will be parsed and each entity becomes
vertex’s attributes as described in Subsection 2.1.
To manage and implement the graph, the Python-
igraph [28] was used since it is fast, community-supported,
and open source. It is also designed for efficiency, porta-
bility, and deployment-friendly. Apache Scalp [25] is em-
ployed to detect attack type in every request log.
The output from graph implementation using Python-igraph
is a GraphML file, a XML-based format for graphs. This
file is processed using Gephi to add color and provide clear
and precise layout. The processed graph is then exported to
Sigma.js code using Sigma.js exporter plugin in Gephi [29]
and the resulting network is configured in Sigma.js server.
This action will enable collaborative and interactive visual-
ization between forensic investigators using web-based in-
terface.
The graph G produced from Subsection 2.1 (Fig. 5), which
is exported to Sigma.js server, is depicted in Fig. 6. When
an investigator clicks a vertex, this tool will show de-
tailed information about all attributes. It can be zoomed
and slid smoothly to view the node accurately as shown
in Fig. 7.
Fig. 6. Large graph visualization in Sigma.js web interface.
Fig. 7. The display when investigator clicks the root of attack
type cluster.
There are three attack types detected in this dataset: 14.66%
cross-site scripting (XSS), remote file execution (RFE)
with 11.64%, local file inclusion (LFI) with 0.13%, and
the normal request account of 65.83%. Table 2 depicts the
examples of detected requests based on every PHP-IDS fil-
ter shown in Table 1. In the first example, the attacker tried
to run a script while in the second one he executed a remote
script that was previously downloaded using wget com-
mand. The last example shows that the attacker attempts
to run an unauthorized file in local directory.
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Table 2
Example of detected malicious requests
No. Raw request Attack
1
193.224.164.47 - - [27/Feb/2006:03:01:23
XSS
-0500] "GET /scripts/..%%35c../winnt/
system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0" 400
297 "-" "-"
2
62.175.253.180 - - [22/Jan/2006:08:28:17
RFE
-0500] "GET /awstats/awstats.pl?configdir=|
echo;echo%20YYY;cd%20%2ftmp%3bwget%20209
%2e136%2e48%2e69%2fmirela%3bchmod%20%2bx
%20mirela%3b%2e%2fmirela;echo%20YYY;echo|
HTTP/1.1" 404 296 "-" "Mozilla/4.0
(compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1;)"
3
218.26.222.13 - - [07/Feb/2006:01:36:28
LFI-0500] "GET /c/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/
c+dir HTTP/1.0" 404 293 "-" "-"
Table 3
Top five countries and their cities for each attack type
No. Attack type Country City Count
1 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
n/a n/a 1497
US Amana 138
US Livingston 120
DE Berlin 108
US Pleasanton 84
2 Remote File Execution (RFE)
n/a n/a 753
CN Beijing 245
US Dallas 99
FR Bischheim 74
US Saint Louis 60
3 Local File Inclusion (LFI)
n/a n/a 4
CN Harbin 2
CN Jinan 2
HU Budapest 2
US Schaumburg 2
List of countries: US – United States, DE – Germany, CN – China,
FR – France, HU – Hungary.
Table 4
Top ten attacker’s IP addresses
No. IP address Attack type Count
1 64.6.73.199 Cross-Site Scripting 138
2 81.114.87.11 Cross-Site Scripting 138
3 80.55.248.206 Cross-Site Scripting 132
4 200.99.135.130 Cross-Site Scripting 120
5 209.137.246.36 Cross-Site Scripting 120
6 211.99.203.228 Remote File Execution 120
7 64.214.80.6 Cross-Site Scripting 108
8 82.127.23.55 Cross-Site Scripting 108
9 85.214.20.161 Cross-Site Scripting 108
10 82.177.96.6 Remote File Execution 107
Table 3 shows the top five countries and their respec-
tive cities for each attack type while Table 4 lists the top
10 attacker’s IP addresses. One can see that there are
very high “n/a” values in Table 3 since the free and open
source version of GeoIP API is used [20] and the pro-
vided data are not as complete as in the paid one. As
stated in Table 3, the most frequently detected IP address
(64.6.73.199) attempted an XSS attack as shown in Table 4.
The remote file inclusion attacks are also included in the
top ten IP addresses while there is no local file inclusion
since it only has a very small number of attempts from the
whole dataset.
4. Conclusions and Future Works
In this paper, a graph-based forensic analysis have been im-
plemented to examine an access log from a web honeypot.
The proposed method employs an agglomerative clustering
to group every record and to model them as an undirected
graph. The clustering has some levels based on node’s at-
tributes, i.e., attack type, attacker IP address, and attacker’s
origin city and country. Every log is checked for its mali-
ciousness, then visualized using a large graph layout, and
then accessed using a web browser. These procedures will
help forensic investigators to examine logs to work interac-
tively and collaboratively with others.
In the future, authors plan to include more access logs
archived in /var/log/httpd. This strategy will enable the in-
vestigator to comprehensively analyze through the last pe-
riod of log rotation (the most common time frame is one
month). The Sigma.js web interface will be improved to
view a specific range of time, although it still displays
a large graph generated from thousands of logs. In ad-
dition, the proposed method can be extended to become
live forensic analysis of a web honeypot or typical web
application by reading and parsing the access log peri-
odically. This approach provides administrators real-time
monitoring and reports if there are any attack attempts to
their system. In relation to the types of offensive activity,
the system will be enhanced with OWASP ModSecurity
Rules [30] which contains more complete rules since it is
actually a web application firewall but that can be utilized
in a forensic manner. To increase the reliability of the pro-
posed technique, authors also plan to implement a graph
database such as Neo4j or Titan (natively distributed one)
to make analyzed logs become persistent and able to be
queried any time.
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